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1  Introduction 
 
Giving the people control over school budgets is conjectured to lead to lower educational 
spending and thus to lower academic achievement. In this paper, this assumption is examined 
for the case of Switzerland, a country with strong variation in the degree of direct democracy 
at the cantonal level. To test the claim of a negative impact, the analysis focuses specifically 
on  the  impact  of  direct  democracy  on  educational  budgets  and  its  effects  on  student 
achievement in the core subjects reading, mathematics and natural science.  
The unexpectedly mediocre performance of Swiss students in the 2000 international PISA 
study has rekindled discussion about improving the Swiss educational system.
1 The ongoing 
debates about school reforms are complicated by the fact that Swiss voters have an important 
influence  on  fiscal  and  budgetary  issues  through  direct  legislation.  In  general,  direct 
legislative  institutions  restrict  the  financial  means  available  to  the  government  for  the 
provision of public goods such as schooling (Bradbury, Mayer, & Case, 2001; Schaltegger, 
2001; Fischer, 2005a).  
Hence, this paper addresses the question whether citizens’ control over the school budget 
necessarily leads to a lower quality of public schooling or not. In this regard, it contributes to 
the discussion in the United States on the impact of tax limits and tax caps on educational 
expenditures and student performance at public schools. While for the US a large number of 
studies  are  available,  corroborating  analyses  for  other  countries  rarely  exist.  Since  Swiss 
cantons  are  heterogeneous  with  respect  to  the  degree  of  citizen  empowerment  through 
institutions of direct democracy, and quite autonomous in their policies on public education, 
Switzerland seems especially suitable for such an analysis. Therefore, this study also aims at 
contributing to the discussion in the US by providing potentially supporting evidence from a 
country with a distinct cultural and historical background.  
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This article analyzes the impact of political institutions on the quality of public education 
using  national  individual  data  on  Swiss  ninth  graders  acquired  simultaneously  with  data 
collection for the 2000 OECD-PISA study. Particularly, this paper explores the ways that 
direct democracy affects public schooling spending and student achievement in core subjects 
in  Switzerland.  In  this  regard,  there  are  some  related  studies  from  the  US  exploiting 
differences in legal institutions across school districts and states. Their main finding is that the 
introduction of property tax limits or caps and thus, implicitly, a limitation of the school 
budget, leads to worse student performance in mathematics, natural science and reading. 
In anticipation of the empirical results, direct democracy is first shown to considerably 
restrict the financial resources available for compulsory public education in Swiss cantons. 
Since  the  combined  cantonal  and  local  school  expenses  are  the  main  source  for  public 
schooling  in  Switzerland,  this  limiting  impact  on  the  subfederal  school  budget  can  be 
considered crucial.  
Subsequently, it is observed that if an educational production function is estimated, direct 
democracy  leads  to  a  considerable  decline  in  student  performance  in  reading  and 
mathematics.  In  contrast,  no  such  effect  is  detected  for  natural  science.  An  important 
contribution of this paper is that the major (negative) impact of direct legislation seems to 
occur solely through the school budget and teacher qualification as a transmission channel. In 
the  previous  literature  empirical  findings  on  the  decisiveness  of  financial  resources  and 
budget-related input factors tended to disagree (e.g. Hanushek, 2002).  
On the other hand, the unmediated, direct impact of popular rights is insignificant for 
reading and natural science, while it is performance improving in mathematics. Thus, beyond 
its financial impact, no further additional detrimental effect of direct democracy on student 
performance can be observed. These findings may be viewed as supporting the hypothesis 
that, at least in Switzerland, no Leviathan-like administrators are present whose impact goes 
beyond the one captured by budgetary effects, contradicting results for the U.S.   
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The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the 
Swiss  political  and  public  educational  system  and  develops  testable  hypotheses  based  on 
previous literature. Section 3 describes the data and model, and outlines the chosen estimation 
methods and the measure of direct democracy. Section 4 presents the estimation results for 
the  institutional  impact  on  educational  spending  and  the  PISA  reading,  mathematics  and 
natural science test scores. Section 5 provides a cross-test subject comparison of the findings, 
while section 6 concludes.  
 
 
2  Education Quality and Direct Democracy 
 
2.1 Direct Democracy 
In modern (semi)direct democracies, a representative democracy is complemented by direct 
democratic institutions. The most prominent  cases are Switzerland and  the  United  States, 
which are both also shaped by a very strong fiscal decentralization, with each level having its 
own sources of tax revenue. Therefore, there exists a direct institutional link between the 
power to tax and the power to spend, as direct legislative institutions provide citizens with the 
political means to influence both sides of the budget equally. In Switzerland, popular rights 
can be exerted at all three levels of the state (federal, cantonal, and communal). Cantonal 
constitutions differ with respect to the degree of direct democracy, which is exerted through 
initiatives and referenda. In addition, Switzerland is one of the most politically decentralized 
countries in the world, and the organization and execution of public education is among the 
core competencies of Swiss cantons (Germann, 2002; Lijphart, 1999: 38). The fundamental 
regulations of public education, school organization and the financial contributions of each 
state level are laid down in various cantonal laws on public education, which are subject to  
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voters’ direct influence through statutory initiatives and referenda. In consequence, since all 
26 cantons differ with respect to the degree of direct democracy in their constitutions, it is 
possible to analyze the impact of a change in citizen empowerment on the provision of public 
schooling (Feld & Kirchgässner, 2001). 
Swiss  cantons  are  not  only  responsible  for  the  organization  of  (compulsory)  public 
education but bear the financial burden for its provision (Swiss federal constitution, art. 62). 
Concerning the overall costs of compulsory education, the federal government contributes 
only 0.2%, whereas the cantons bear 38.8% and the communes 61.1%.
2 With respect to the 
communes, they mostly finance primary schools. In general, in all 26 Swiss cantons, two 
types of advanced education can be distinguished: basic education and education to meet 
advanced requirements (e.g. university preparation). Usually, the second type can only be 
entered on a selective basis, either through passing an entry examination or having obtained a 
certain average grade in the prior school year. However, as public education is in the authority 
of cantons, virtually 26 different school systems coexist within Switzerland, differing in their 
financial structure, organization and school curricula (Freitag & Bühlmann, 2003; Meunier, 
2004). For example, in some cantons secondary I education commences after completion of 
the sixth year of schooling, while in others it starts after the forth or fifth year. However, in all 
cantons compulsory education, that includes primary and secondary I education, finishes with 
the ninth grade, excluding secondary II education. This distinction is important as the dataset 
which is employed in this study is based on student performance of ninth graders, at the end 
of compulsory education.   
At the time of the study, there was a vast heterogeneity across cantons in the organization 
of teacher education.
3 Training of primary and secondary I teachers took place at over 150 
cantonal  teacher  seminaries,  and  the  regional  validity  of  the  earned  teacher  certificate 
impeded mobility of teaching personnel across Swiss cantons. In Switzerland, the duration of 
teacher training in these teacher seminaries varied regionally between one and four years. In  
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contrast, teachers for secondary II schools were educated at universities, where an at least 
four-year  lasting  study  led  to  a  subject-specific  master’s  degree,  e.g.  a  M.Sc.  in  Biology 
(supplemented  by  pedagogical  courses).  Whereas  admission  to  university  required  a 
secondary  II  degree  obtained  after  twelve  to  thirteen  years  of  schooling,  a  primary  or 
secondary  I teacher in spe started her training  after completion of  compulsory  education, 
namely after just nine years of schooling. Overall, the educational gap between these two 
types of teachers in Switzerland amounted to approximately four to five years of education. 
And even qualitatively, those who qualified for university studies had passed at least two 
selection processes during schooling, in contrast to those attending teacher seminaries (see 
EDK, 2001). 
 
2.2 The literature and hypotheses 
Institutions of direct legislation, argue their many supporters, serve as a means to discipline 
politicians and bureaucrats, who are assumed to behave in a Niskanen-like manner rather than 
as benevolent dictators (Niskanen, 1975). Specifically, these bureaucrats exercise monopoly 
power and aim at maximizing their budgets.
4 In consequence, means of direct legislation are 
thought  to  limit  the  government  spending  without  negatively  affecting  the  quality  of  the 
provided public goods, indicating an allocation of goods and resources closer to the median 
voter’s preferences through reducing waste (Feld & Kirchgässner, 2001; Pommerehne, 1978, 
1983; Besley and Coate, 2001).
5 In the US, people in favor of the introduction of school 
budget-restraining tax limits actually did believe that these budget cuts would lead to such 
efficiency gains in the provision of schooling (Temple, 1996). That, in principle, in economic 
reality  such  potential  for  improvement  might  exist  can  be  concluded  from  the  beneficial 
impact of competition among public schools, which lowered per pupil spending, but equally 
raised student test scores (Hoxby, 2000).   
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Local revenue and thus school budgets, in particular, appeared considerably reduced in the 
U.S. through the introduction of property tax limits, often through statutory initiatives (Card 
& Payne, 2002; Bradbury, Mayer, & Case; 2001; Shadbegian, 1999, 2003).
6 As regards direct 
democracy, for Switzerland various studies show that it leads to both smaller revenue and 
smaller expenditure of (combined) cantonal and communal budgets (Kirchgässner, 2002; Feld 
and Matsusaka, 2003; Hug, 2004). This effect is stronger for those policy areas in which 
Swiss cantons are granted political autonomy by the Swiss constitution (art. 3 of the Swiss 
federal constitution), specifically, the health system, culture, and education (Germann, 2002; 
Schaltegger,  2001).
7  In  particular,  in  Switzerland  government’s  educational  expenses  for 
several school types were found to be lowered by direct democracy (Fischer, 2005, 2005a). In 
contrast,  Freitag  &  Bühlmann  (2003)  find  no  linkage  between  effectively  used  direct 
democratic institutions and educational expenses of Swiss cantons, while for the US Santerre 
(1989) identifies even an  educational spending  increasing  influence  in town-meeting type 
communities  among  90  jurisdictions  in  Connecticut.  On  the  other  hand,  Megdal  (1983) 
reports ambiguous results for the effect of the existence of school budget referenda in 177 
New Jersey school districts.
8 Some of these contradicting findings can, however, be explained 
by incomparability of institutions or level of analysis.
9 
In  response  to  such  budget  constraints,  in  jurisdictions  with  stronger  popular  rights  a 
reliance  on  user  charges  was  observed  that  makes  the  quality  of  the  public  good  more 
independent  of  the  financial  resources  of  the  government  (Feld  &  Matsusaka,  2000; 
Matsusaka,  1995).  However,  in  the  case  of  compulsory  and  free  public  schooling,  this 
solution is (politically) not an option. Consequently, if the school administration were already 
working efficiently prior the decision to cut its budget, a decline in the quality of the public 
service  should  be  revealed  even  though  the  school  administrator  in  charge  acted  like  a 
‘benevolent dictator’.  
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Modern economic theories of bureaucracies such as that of Niskanen, however, assume a 
selfish,  namely  budget-maximizing  behavior  of  the  administrator  (e.g.  Inman,  1979). 
Extending these theories, limitation of the budget is suggested to give rise to two different 
adaptive strategies. The first is a substitution of budget maximization with a re-allocation of 
means between budget components such that administrative staff is increased at the expense 
of the resources available for production of the public good (Williamson, 1964). The rationale 
for this strategy is that a large personal staff gives the bureaucrat a feeling of importance and 
power  (Downs,  1967).  Thus,  when  facing  the  decision  to  cut  either  administrative  or 
instructional spending, a Leviathan-like school administrator is expected to choose the latter. 
Indeed, for U.S. school districts, Figlio (1998) shows that the above mentioned tax limits are 
associated  with  a  spending  shift  from  the  teaching  component  to  the  administration 
component of school budgets (see also Dye & McGuire, 1997; Figlio, 1997).
10 Equally, such 
spending shift was then found to be mirrored by larger class sizes, higher pupil-teacher ratios, 
lower  beginning  teachers’  wages,  worse  teacher  qualification,  unchanged  level  of  school 
service,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  ongoing  overstaffing  of  administrations  (Downes,  1996; 
Figlio, 1998, 1997, 1997a; Shadbegian, 2000, 2003; Poterba & Rueben, 1995).  
Alternatively, Figlio & O’Sullivan (2001) propose a manipulative bureaucratic behavior 
in which the administrator deliberately allows the quality of the public good to decline by 
allocating (relatively) fewer financial resources to its provision. Being persuaded that budget 
limitation has a deleterious impact on the quality of the public good, the administrator expects 
the electorate to overrule (‘override’) the previous tax limit vote in the next election. Indeed, 
Figlio  &  O’Sullivan  (2001),  using  expense  data  for  police,  fire  protection,  and  general 
administration from 5,150 U.S. cities, show that in those cities with a so-called ‘override 
option’,  the  deterioration  in  public  service  was  larger  than  in  cities  without  this  option. 
Moreover, they observe the same phenomenon with respect to teacher-administrator ratios in 
school districts with an override option.
 11   
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In consequence, in both cases of adaptive behavior of the bureaucrat, budget cuts will lead 
to a decline of the quality of the produced public good. As regards the research question of 
this paper, the quality of public schooling might be assessed using objective measures of 
student achievement. For the U.S., during the 1990s various empirical multivariate analyses 
of the impact of newly introduced tax limits on student performance were carried out.
12 Most 
of these studies are based on a simple educational production function augmented with a tax 
limit dummy that replaces traditional school resources and input variables such as e.g. class 
size or teacher quality (e.g. Figlio, 1997). For example, in a cross-state analysis, Figlio (1997) 
reports a substantially lowering influence of tax limits on student performance in science, 
social studies, and reading examinations. Moreover, Downes and Figlio (1997) find a tax limit 
associated with a sizeable and significant decline in statewide mean student performance in 
mathematics (cf. also Downes, Dye, & McGuire, 1998).
13 
However,  to  my  knowledge,  non  of  the  ‘tax  limit  literature’  tests  the  direct  relation 
between educational spending and student performance, although all of them conjecture the 
school budget to work as tax limit’s transmission channel.
14 Other educational economists, 
however,  report  ambiguous  results  with  respect  to  the  influence  of  spending  or  school 
resources on students’ test scores (for reviews, see Hanushek 1986, 1996, 2002).  
Based on this evidence, I formulate the following hypotheses which I intend to test with 
Swiss data: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  
Direct Democracy exerts a spending restraint impact on educational spending.  
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Hypothesis 2:  
Direct  democracy  increases  efficiency  in  the  provision  of  schooling.  Thus,  through 




Direct democracy does not lead to efficiency gains. In consequence, it leads to worse 
student performance caused by the induced school budget cuts. 
 
Hypothesis 4: 
Direct  democracy  provokes  counteraction  of  Leviathan-like  school  administrators. 
Consequently, not only through smaller school budgets, but even more through activities 
of the bureaucrats going beyond the financial realm student performance is worsened.  
 
 
3  Data and Model 
 
3.1  The Data 
Sociodemographic,  economic  and  fiscal  determinants  at  the  cantonal  level  and  a  cultural 
(language)  factor  are  obtained  from  the  Swiss  Federal  Statistical  Office;  some  aggregate 
indicators such as ideology of cantonal government, tax competition and fiscal constraints are 
based on my own calculations or that of my colleagues Lars P. Feld, G. Kirchgässner and Ch. 
Schaltegger. Cantonal culture is measured by a dichotomous variable for French- and Italian-
speaking cantons. The expenditure variables are for combined local and cantonal educational  
  11
per  pupil  spending  in  primary  and  secondary  I  education.
15  All  monetary  variables  are 
deflated to the base year 1980. 
For  estimating an  educational production function  composed  of school  characteristics, 
classroom-related characteristics, peer characteristics, and, student background information, 
the so-called national study accompanying the PISA 2000 survey is employed.
16 This national 
studies used identical questionnaires for the same test subjects, statistical methods of sample 
selection and test score construction as the OECD PISA 2000 survey. Due to its focus, more 
students were assessed in reading than in the two other subjects. However, in contrast to the 
OECD-PISA study, which sampled the 15-year old irrespective of their educational stage, the 
population of the national study includes only ninth graders. For this reason, the matching of 
schools and students makes it possible to construct classroom-based peer variables. As in the 
OECD  PISA  data,  test  scores  are  obtained  as  weighted  likelihood  estimates.  More 
specifically, they are constructed as a weighted average of correct responses, with the weights 
reflecting the level of difficulty of the question (Hambleton & Swaminathan, 1985; Warm, 
1989). In consequence, a student who answers one more challenging question correctly might 
perform as equally well as someone who gave correct responses to a small number of more 
simple questions. 
Students  attending  classes  of  less  than  20  are  excluded  from  the  analysis  to  prevent 
endogeneity  in  the  peer  group  variables  because  in  smaller  classes  the  respondent’s 
performance is more likely to have an impact on the average achievement of her peers than in 
larger classes.
17 The mean of the reading test score was originally normalized at 500, with a 
standard deviation of 90 for the whole national dataset, but because of the deletion process, 
the mean of the sample I use is about 530, with a standard deviation of approximately 80 
based on a final sample of about 3,530 observations. For descriptive statistics of the core 




Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Finally, as explanatory variable of interest a measure of direct democracy is employed 
which was constructed  for the  year 2000 based on the methodology described in Stutzer 
(1999).  It  is  an  unweighted  average  of  four  subindices  that  evaluate  the  power  of  the 
constitutional  initiative,  the  statutory  initiative,  the  fiscal  referendum,  and  the  statutory 
referendum. The strength of these popular rights are assessed based on the stipulations in the 
cantonal constitutions with respect to the number of signatures to be collected, the number of 
days available for their collection, and the financial threshold of the expenditure project, if 
applicable. The four subindices are constructed based on the awarded points for each single 
requirement  with  a  higher  number  reflecting  stronger  popular  rights.  As  most  of  these 
subindices of direct democracy are highly correlated with up to ρ= 0.8, using the overall 
index in place of the single subindices is highly recommended. The overall index of direct 
democracy  takes  on  values  between  1  and  6,  with  6  indicating  the  highest  degree  of 
empowerment of the cantonal electorate. In our data, the lowest value (1.75) is observed for 
the canton ‘Geneva’ while the highest is achieved by ‘Glarus’ (5.75). For the year 2000, the 
values for all 26 cantons are displayed in Table A1 of the Appendix.  
Nevertheless,  this  index  measures  the  presence  of  these  institutions  rather  than  their 
effective use. Feld & Kirchgässner (2001) demonstrate that the mere existence of such an 
institution is already sufficient to induce a change in policy outcomes because it serves as a 
credible threat by the citizenry in a game theoretical context. According to this model, popular 
rights are only actively exerted in case of strong deviations of the politicians’ decisions from 
the  median  voter’s  preferred  policy.  In  consequence,  employing  a  measure  of  effective 
exertion of direct legislation would understate the true effect of this institution. In addition, it  
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should be  noted that  this approach  follows most  of the public finance  and public  choice 
literature. Definitions and descriptive statistics of all dependent and explanatory variables are 
provided in Tables A2 and A3 of the Appendix.  
 
 
3.2 The Model 
To test hypothesis 1,  a  typical model  of public finance will be  estimated. The following 
equation describes such an expenditure function: 
 
expenditure = f(democracy, economy, politics, sociodemographic factors, culture). 
 
In this model, government expenditure is regarded as a function of the degree of direct 
democracy.  As  controlling  variables,  also  included  are  measures  accounting  for  fiscal 
decentralization (defined as share of local expenses in total cantonal and local expenses), 
urbanization  of  the  canton,  cantonal  wealth,  size  of  canton,  tax  competition,  a  fiscally 
effective constitutional  ‘break’, the share  of  young, old  people ( < 20  years,  >  60  years, 
respectively) and educated people, government ideology (with positive values indicating a 
conservative  position),  coalition  size,  and  cantonal  culture,  proxied  by  the  dominating 
language. A prediction of the impact of these controls and their theoretical foundation can be 
found in Feld, Fischer, & Kirchgässner (2006). 
Hypotheses 2 through 4 will be tested by estimating a reduced form and a structural form 
of an educational production function model. In contrast to the reduced form, the structural 
form also includes revenue-driven 'endogenous' input factors that serve as potential budgetary 
transmission channel of direct democracy. These endogenous input factors include teacher 
qualification, teacher shortages, total hours of schooling, student-teacher ratio, access to PCs,  
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availability and quality of instruction material, and state of school building or availability of 
space. Consequently, the structural form to be estimated looks as follows: 
 
performance = f(democracy, culture, individual, peers, school, canton, school inputs), 
 
where  democracy  denotes  again  direct  democratic  institutions,  and  culture  the  main 
regional culture of the school location. Individual denotes the student's individual and family 
characteristics  such  as  gender  and  parents'  education.  Peers  stands  for  peer  group 
characteristics that aim at measuring the external effects of the peer group on an individual's 
academic  performance.
18  School  denotes  non-revenue-driven  school/class-related 
characteristics like the selectivity of the institution or problems with class discipline. Canton 
represents cantonal sociodemographics which serve as proxies for missing individual and peer 
group characteristics in class (e.g. religion, poverty). Finally, school inputs denote revenue-
driven school inputs as described above. For predicting the impact of the sociodemographic 
and peer controls, see e.g. Winston & Zimmerman (2003) or Figlio (1997). 
In the reduced form of the model, the ‘endogenous’ variables are excluded, so that the 
following equation results: 
 
performance = f(democracy, culture, individual, peers, school, canton).   
 
Estimation of both the reduced and the structural form of the model allows then to test 
hypotheses 2 through 4, in particular, (1) whether school inputs affect student performance, 
(2) whether they serve as transmission channel of direct democracy, and (3) whether a non-
budgetary influence of direct democracy prevails. Most of the US literature which identfies an 
institutional  impact  employs  variations  of  the  reduced  form  of  the  model,  but  not  of  the 
structural form. To my knowledge, only one estimation reported in Downes, Dye, & McGuire  
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(1998) resembles the structural model most.
19 In other words, most of the US literature does 
not directly test the presence of a transmission channel of the budget constraining institution. 
 
3.3 Methodology 
The expenditure regression is estimated with OLS using aggregate data that form a synthetic 
panel with 26 cantons as observational units per year between 1980 and 1998. Newey-West 
standard errors correct for heteroscedasticity and serial autocorrelation, and the Jarcque-Bera 
test assesses the presence of outliers. As robustness test, the identical model is estimated with 
those observations excluded with residuals above or below 1.5 standard deviation. 
As regards the educational production function, both the reduced and the structural model 
are  estimated  using  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS).  Standard  errors  of  the  coefficients  are 
corrected for heteroscedasticity, but also clustered at the school level (Moulton, 1990). This 
latter correction takes into account that students who attend identical schools share common 
factors both at the school and cantonal level – for example, condition of the school building 
and political institutions in the canton.
20  
Besides the peer effects discussed above, some of the remaining determinants of student 
achievement, however, might be subject to potential simultaneity. For example, frequency of 
individual homework feedback or a higher age could be proxies for bad grades at school. 
Additionally, the selection of pupils into different school types (and classes) is not fully taken 
into account with this estimation method. Simultaneity might induce a bias in the estimated 
coefficients. An instrumentation of endogenous variables or a correction for sample selection, 
however,  cannot  be  carried  out  because  the  PISA  data  do  not  provide  the  necessary 
exogenous instruments (for a discussion, see also Rangvid 2004, Graddy & Stevens 2005).   
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For space constraints, the discussion of the estimation results for educational spending and 
student performance focuses on the influence of the variables of interest, in particular the 




4  Estimation Results  
 
4.1 Direct Democracy and Educational Spending 
The first hypothesis is tested by analyzing the impact of direct democracy on combined local 
and cantonal per pupil spending for compulsory schooling in Switzerland. For this purpose, a 
model of government spending using a synthetic panel from 1980 to 1998 is estimated. The 
dependent  variable  has  been  logarithmized.  In  Table  2,  the  negative  coefficient  of  the 
institutional variable indicates that direct democracy exerts a spending-lowering influence on 
primary and secondary I education, with significance at the 1 percent level. Thus, stronger 
citizen empowerment leads to less annual spending for compulsory education, ceteris paribus. 
An  adjusted  R2  of  about  0.72  confirms  the  good  explanatory  power  of  the  model.  The 
normality of the distribution of the residuals is rejected (at the ten percent level), but an 
exclusion  of  outliers  above  or  below  the  1.5  standard  deviation  limit  leads  to  identical 
empirical results with respect to the impact of direct democracy and for most of the remaining 
predictors.  Splitting  up  the  expenses  by  current  and  investment  spending,  which  usually 
fluctuates more erratically over time, finds an identical restraining impact of stronger citizen 
empowerment for both budget components (see Table A4 of the Appendix). Clearly, these 
estimation outcomes are in line with previous empirical analyses and in strong support of 
hypothesis 1 which stated that less money would be spent on education in the presence of 
stronger popular rights.
22   
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4.2 Student Achievement in Reading 
The first two columns of Table 3 display the OLS estimation results for reading for both the 
reduced form and the structural form of the educational production function. In the reduced 
form,  direct  democracy  exerts  a  performance  lowering  impact  on  an  average  student 
(significant  at  the  5  percent  level).  As  regards  the  size  of  the  impact,  it  appears  to  be 
considerable. Since this index ranges from 1 to 6, the maximum reduction in the test score for 
an average student due to direct legislative institutions is about 46 difficulty adjusted test 
score  points,  which  is  slightly  more  than  half  a  standard  deviation.  Nevertheless,  more 
sizeable impacts by far are exerted, for example, by high parental income, age, gender, the 
situation of the pupil at home, and the selectivity of the attended school (see Table A5 of the 
Appendix for complete results).  
In the structural form that includes the educational input factors at the school and class 
level that are financed through cantonal and local sources, the OLS estimate of the index of 
direct democracy is equally negative, but it is far from being significant at any conventional 
level (column  (2)). Clearly, for an  average student, political institutions do not exert  any 
significant impact on reading test scores if revenue-driven input factors are explicitly taken 
into account.  
Regarding the school resource-driven input variables, no access to a PC at school appears 
to be detrimental for an average student's academic achievement in reading.
23 The shares of 
teachers who have obtained a master’s degree at a university, on the other hand, are associated 
with a higher test score, exerting an impact of considerable magnitude. Nevertheless, the 
coefficients of the remaining input factors, such as conditions of the school building, lack of 
instructional material, shortage of teachers, hours of teaching and student-teacher ratio, are 
not significant at any conventional level. The adjusted R2 of around 0.27 for both regressions 
indicates a good fit of this model for a cross section.  
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In sum, a significant performance decreasing impact of direct democracy is observed in 
the  reduced  form  and  an  insignificant  coefficient  in  the  structural  form.  Obviously,  the 
disappearance  of  its  significance  in  the  structural  form  is  due  to  the  inclusion  of  these 
revenue-driven  input  factors.  Consequently,  school  budget-related  input  factors  appear  to 
serve as transmission channel of direct democracy, particularly having access to PCs and 
teacher qualification. This view is supported by the fact that direct democracy was shown to 
dampen subfederal expenditure for public schools in the previous regression (Table 2) and 
thus potentially restrain spending for school budget-dependent inputs at the school and class 
level.  
In the reduced form, the performance lowering influence clearly contradicts hypothesis 2 
that no deleterious influence of lower educational spending would be present due to efficiency 
gains in the provision of public education. The estimation results of the structural form lend 
support  to  the  budget-channel  hypothesis  3,  but  equally  partly  reject  the  Leviathan-
administrator  hypothesis  4,  as  no  further  deleterious  institutional  impact  beyond  the  one 
through  the  endogenous,  budgetary  variables  is  detected.  Clearly,  the  estimation  results 
suggest that fewer financial means available at the subfederal level for public schooling do 
translate into lower student performance. It can also be concluded that ‘money matters’ for 
student performance in reading, a noteworthy epiphenomenon of the empirical results.  
 
4.3 Student Achievement in Mathematics 
The OLS results for the reduced form in Table 3 column (3) reveal an insignificant impact of 
direct democracy for an average student in mathematics. In contrast, the OLS estimate in the 
structural form (column (4)), when endogenous input factors are taken into account, yields a 
significant performance enhancing effect on test scores (at the 5 percent level). The size of 
this estimate indicates that a jump from the lowest to the highest level of direct democracy  
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would translate into a sizeable effect of about 63 additional test score points, almost as large 
as the standard deviation of 80 points in mathematics.  
As regards the revenue-driven input variables, influences similar to those obtained for 
reading  are  found.  Most  particularly,  for  the  average  student  the  share  of  mathematics 
teachers with a master’s degree appears to have a significant and sizeable test score raising 
influence  (at  the  1  percent level),  and the  coefficient  of the share  of  university  educated 
persons  in  the  teaching  personnel  is  also  positive  and  close  to  statistical  significance.  In 
addition,  a  higher  number  of  hours  of  schooling  is  positively  associated  with  student 
performance,  although  with  a  small-sized  impact.  However,  none  of  the  remaining  input 
controls, including  the  equipment  of schools with PCs, are of importance for the student 
achievement in mathematics.  
Reflection on the findings for mathematics – particularly a comparison of the results for 
both forms of the model – leads to the conclusion that the insignificant coefficient of direct 
democracy  in the reduced  form must have been caused by the mutual  cancellation of an 
observable  positive  (direct)  influence  and  an  assumedly  negative  mediated  through  the 
revenue-driven input factors. As the significance level of the coefficient of direct legislation 
changes through control of these endogenous inputs, which are most possibly also influenced 
by this institution, they obviously serve as transmission channels of this institution. Thus, the 
results reflect again a performance dampening indirect impact of direct democracy through 
lower educational spending, clearly contradicting the efficiency-gains hypothesis 2, and rather 
in  line  with  the  budget-channel  hypothesis  3.  A  second  conclusion  might  be  that  fewer 
financial means at the subfederal level do matter for student performance 
However, we also find an achievement raising direct institutional impact in the structural 
form of the educational production function. This result suggests a rejection of the Leviathan-
administrator hypothesis 4 as no further detrimental impact of direct democracy going beyond 
the school budget channel is detected. This performance improving finding might indicate  
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that in  more  direct democratic  cantons  teaching  of mathematics is favored by  the  school 




Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------------------------------- 
 
4.4 Student Achievement in Natural Science 
As regards natural science, in the reduced form the OLS estimate of the coefficient of direct 
democracy on student test scores indicates that for the average student there is no significant 
effect of  direct legislation on  student  performance  (see Table 3 column  (5)). Also in the 
structural form of the model, the coefficient of the variable of interest is insignificant (column 
(6)). This result can be interpreted to mean that taking into account the potential influence of 
direct democracy through the subfederal budgetary channel reveals no institutional impact 
beyond the indirect one. 
Patterns of influence similar to those for reading and mathematics are observed for some 
endogenous  input  variables  that  form  part  of  the  structural  form.  As  in  reading  and 
mathematics, the qualification of  (natural science)  teachers  appears to  be a very  decisive 
predictor of student performance both in terms of significance and size (at the 5 and 1 percent 
levels of significance). Also, as in mathematics, more hours of schooling improves academic 
achievement,  but  still  exerting  an  impact  of  negligible  size.  In  contrast  to  reading  and 
mathematics, however, a shortage of teachers also appears to be detrimental (at the 5 percent 
level), while student-teacher ratio only appears weakly significant (at the 10 percent level). 
Further, the lack of instructional material is strongly associated with lower test performance in  
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natural science (at the 1 percent level). As in mathematics but in contrast to reading, however, 
the equipment of the school with PCs is not an influential factor of test scores.  
To summarize the findings for natural science, institutions of direct legislation do not 
appear to influence student performance in any way. A comparison of the findings for the 
reduced and structural forms reveals no achievement decreasing impact of direct democracy 
mediated through the school budget, clearly rejecting hypothesis 3. Because the number of 
observed students for natural science is similar to that of mathematics test-takers, it is unlikely 
that the insignificances are caused by a small sample size. Thus, it is concluded that stronger 
empowerment  of  the  people  has  no  effect  whatsoever  on  student  performance  in  natural 
science in the ninth grade. 
 
4.5 Robustness tests 
Estimation of the identical models with missing values replaced by imputed values using a hot 
deck imputation method did not lead to substantially different results to the ones presented 
above. Also, the findings for direct democracy were quite robust to small alterations in model 
specification,  like  the  inclusion  of  cantonal  per  pupil  school  expenditure  as  additional 
endogenous  determinant  or  the  omission  of  peer  variables.
24  Unfortunately,  limited 
availability of data did not allow to replace the revenue-driven school inputs with institution-
specific spending data. Moreover, the results appeared quite insensitive to the exclusion of 
single cantons from the sample.
25  
It  might  be  argued  that  the  magnitude  of  the  teacher  qualification  coefficient  is  an 
indicator  of  model  misspecification.  Testing  several  non-linear  specifications,  however, 
teacher qualification remains the most important determinant in terms of significance level 
and size. A model misspecification and biased estimates, however, might still be present in 
case  teacher  qualification  proxied  the  attractiveness  of  the  school:  schools  with  well- 
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performing and thus easy-to-teach students might be favored for employment by prospective 
teachers.
26 To address this problem, several other variables in the model aim to control for 
school attractiveness, such as measures of type and location of school, and, most important, 
average and heterogeneity in performance of the respondent’s peers, that might proxy school-
specific student body intelligence. Furthermore, the actual confidence intervals of the teacher 
qualification coefficients are wide, ranging roughly from 0 to 50, indicating that for the single 
school the magnitude of its actual effect varies considerably from being negligible to being 
decisive. This result supports the view that the bias of the teacher qualification coefficients is 
probably small. 
Furthermore, inclusion of controls for particular school types, for example by their focus 
either on a professional or an academic career, or by their stage of education (primary vs. 
secondary  I)  would  have  been  desirable,  but  could  not  be  realized:  In  Switzerland,  as 
described  in  the  introductory  paragraphs,  each  canton  has  its  own  school  regulation  and 
organization. In consequence, institutions of public education below the university level are 
often barely comparable so that an inter-cantonal variable for different school types could not 
be constructed. Furthermore, the number of students tested in a specific canton is often too 
small to allow for canton-specific school type indicators. Included is, however, a measure of 
‘selectivity’ of the institution based on the school principal’s information.
27  
This study employs data from the national study, which comprises two data sets: one that 
covers  whole  Switzerland  (the  ‘Swiss’  sample)  and  one  that  represents  only  the  French-
speaking regions (the ‘French’ sample). It might be argued that merging two datasets might 
bias  the  estimation  outcomes  due  to  potential  overrepresentation  of  the  French-speaking 
students. However, testing the models with the smaller Swiss subsample and application of 
transversal weights yields qualitatively identical results.   
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4.6 Direct Democracy and Teacher Qualification 
Nevertheless, the chosen procedure and the estimation results might still not fully convince 
that direct democracy influences student performance through teacher qualification unless an 
analysis of the direct relations between political institutions, educational spending and teacher 
qualifications is carried out.  
Figures  1  through  4  illustrate  the  correlations  between  the  four  different  teacher 
qualification variables and the index of direct democracy averaged over 1990 to 2000. The 
decreasing regression line suggests that there exists a negative correlation between the extent 





Insert Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4 about here 
------------------------------------------------- 
 
In addition, a model of demand for high quality teachers based on around 150 schools has 
been estimated. The variable of interest is the log of subfederal educational spending  for 
compulsory schooling per pupil averaged from 1990 to 2000 to capture long-term effects and 
mitigate endogeneity. If higher levels of educational spending were driven by higher teacher 
wages and a better equipment of schools that facilitate teaching, a higher share of university 
graduates  would  choose  the  teaching  profession.
29  Following  demand  for  school  resource 
models presented by Figlio (1997, 1998), Poterba (1997), and Hoxby (2000), I also include 
controlling variables both at the cantonal and the school level that account for school and 
socio-demographic characteristics determining the need of and demand for higher qualified 
teachers, that are not (fully) captured by the educational spending variable.
30   
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The estimation outcomes for the variable of interest, based on the samples with outliers 
excluded,  are  presented  in  Table  4.
31  They  indicate  that  educational  expenditures  for 
compulsory  education  are  positively  associated  with  the  proportion  of  teachers  holding  a 
master’s degree in the three core subjects reading, mathematics and natural science, and in the 
overall teaching body. Replacing the spending variable with the direct democracy variable 
reveals an identical (negative) relation for the three core subjects only (not reported). Clearly, 
these findings correspond with figures 1 through 4 which depict the negative correlations 
between direct democracy and teacher qualification. 
32 
However,  since  this  analysis  is  based  on  cross-sectional  data  and  with  variation  of 
institutions at the cantonal level only, these estimation results should be interpreted with some 
caution. On he other hand, having used averages of school expenditure data helps overcome a 
bias  induced  when  employing  contemporaneously  measured  school  inputs.  Furthermore, 
estimation  at  the  more  disaggregate  school-level  mitigates  the  distortion  induced  by 
measuring  educational  expenditure  at  the  cantonal  level  (see  Hanushek,  2002;  Hanushek, 
Rivkin, & Taylor, 1996)  
 
------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------------------- 
 
Clearly, the estimation results suggest a strong linkage between educational spending or 
direct democracy and teacher qualification. In particular, in Swiss cantons lower educational 
spending levels seem to make the teaching profession less attractive to university educated 
persons. These unfavorable findings are quite in line with evidence presented by Figlio (1997, 
1997a, 1998, 1999; Figlio & Rueben, 2001), who showed in school districts with a budget 
restraint  (tax  limit)  not  only  teachers’  starting  wages  to  be  lower,  but  also  quality  and  
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5  Comparison of the Results for Reading, Mathematics 
and Natural Science 
 
The  empirical  results  for  reading,  mathematics,  and  natural  science  reflect  completely 
different  findings  and  elicit  interesting  interpretations.  These  results  are  discussed  with 
respect to the direct and indirect impact of direct democracy on overall student performance 
in a subject, and the allocation of given resources between subjects. 
For both reading and mathematics, we find strong support for school budgets and teacher 
qualification  working  as a transmission  channel of  direct democracy.  More precisely, the 
indirect, mediated effect of direct legislation appears to be test score lowering, and for both 
subjects, the lack of available financial means for public education at the subfederal level 
appears  responsible.  This  estimation  result  contradicts  empirical  literature  by  education 
economists such as Hanushek (1986) and Hanushek, Rivkin, & Taylor (1996) who found no 
link between school resources and student performance.
33 On the other hand, my conclusions 
are supported by similar views expressed in more recent studies such as Graddy & Stevens 
(2003), Pan, Rudo, & Smith-Hansen (2003), or Pan et al. (2003). Such test score lowering 
institutional impact, however, is not made for natural science, possibly because, in contrast to 
mathematics and reading which are taught from the very beginning of compulsory schooling, 
physics and chemistry are introduced into the school curricula only in higher grades.
34 
In particular, qualification of the teaching personnel is identified as important determinant 
of  student  achievement  in  all  three  test  subjects.  Moreover,  teacher  qualification  at  the  
  26
university level appears positively linked to educational expenses and negatively to the degree 
of direct democracy, as expected.  In addition, these results indicate that costly equipping 
schools with particularly human capital resources is important for student performance in 
these subjects, and is in contrast to the claims by some politicians and educational economists 
that teacher qualification did not matter for student performance.
35  
In this study for Swiss students, the significant impact of teacher qualification might well 
be  country-specific  as  the  gap  between  high  and  low  qualified  teachers  is  wider  in 
Switzerland  than  in  other  countries  like  the  US.  In  fact,  Meunier  (2004)  finds  teacher 
qualification  equally  decisive  for  Swiss  student  performance.
36  Specifically,  as  stated  in 
section 2.1, at the time the study was conducted training of teachers in Switzerland meant 
either  earning  a  master’s  degree  at  universities  or  graduation  from  so-called  ‘teacher 
seminaries’ with a degree equivalent to completed secondary II education, thus far below the 
bachelor’s level (EDK, 2001: 152).
37 In contrast, in other countries teachers are exclusively 
educated at universities and complete their training with either a bachelor’s or a master’s 
degree.
38 Consequently, while studies on the influence of teacher qualification in the US have 
yielded ambiguous results, the observed importance for Swiss students might rather be in line 
with previous research that detected a strong positive correlation between teacher IQ or test 
scores  with  student  performance  (see  Hanushek,  2002,  for  a  survey).  The  importance  of 
teacher quality for educational achievement, should not be understated as a ‘good’ teacher 
appears often as most decisive factor of student achievement, with an influence far beyond 
that  of  e.g.  class  size  (Hanushek,  1992).  For  example,  a  good  teacher  lets  students  gain 
additional increases in testable knowledge equivalent to up to one school year and might be 
able to bridge gaps in educational achievement caused by e.g. differing family background 
(Hanushek, 1992; Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005).  
However, regarding the direct, unmediated impact of direct democracy on student test 
scores in the structural form of the educational production function, the findings indicate a  
  27
performance  enhancing  effect  for  mathematics  and  an  insignificant  one  for  reading  and 
natural science. This result contradicts the findings in Downes, Dye, & McGuire (1998), the 
only study in which endogenous input variables are controlled for. (All the remaining studies 
on tax limits and student performance cited in the paper tested only the reduced form). In 
particular, Downes, Dye, & McGuire (1998) report a deleterious effect of budget-reducing tax 
limits  for  both  forms  of  the  educational  production  function.  Thus,  for  Switzerland,  the 
hypothesis of a Leviathan-like behavior that goes beyond the one taken into account by the 
budgetary  endogenous  input  factors  (hypothesis  4)  has  to  be  clearly  rejected,  contrasting 
results for the US. However, as long as it is not tested whether all school budget components 
are  equally  reduced  by  direct  democracy  or  not,  a  complete  rejection  of  the  Leviathan-
hypothesis is not possible. Such analysis, however, goes beyond the scope of this paper.
39 
A  conjecture  about  direct  democracy  inducing  a  reallocation  between  test  subjects  is 
possible if the results in the structural forms for reading, mathematics and natural science are 
compared. Based on such a comparison, it might be concluded that a reallocation of given 
means, particularly a shift of given resources to mathematics, could have occurred in more 
direct democratic cantons. However, given that the regression results reflect only a small 
portion  of  the  school  curriculum,  it  is  unclear  from  which  school  subjects  the  additional 
resources for mathematics have been withdrawn. Based on median voter models (e.g. Feld & 
Kirchgässner,  2001),  it  can  be  conjectured  that  such  re-allocation,  induced  by  stronger 
institutions of direct democracy, again reflects the politicians’ response to the electorate’s 
preferences. For example, school administrations in more direct democratic cantons might 
respond to such demand in the population by putting a particular focus on quality checks of 
mathematics teaching. Such demand might arise from a greater awareness of the importance 
of financial issues and knowledge of mathematics as tool for their assessment that might be 
correlated  with  stronger  popular  rights,  which  includes  deciding  about  government 
expenditure projects. Equally, based on Becker’s human capital theory (Becker, 1964), such  
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preference  might mirror relatively  higher  wages earned in ‘male’  professions that  require 
strong mathematics skills, such as e.g. engineering or management positions. The demand for 
prioritizing  mathematics  skills  might  be  correlated  with  citizen  empowerment  if  gender-
specific asymmetries in the distribution of political power are present.  
 
 
6  Conclusion  
 
For the U.S., Figlio (1997, 1998) shows that local tax limits that reduced the tax base for local 
school budgets lead to larger class sizes, lower teacher wages, and worse teacher quality, but 
not to any reduction in administrative personnel. These results suggest that instead of the 
expected  efficiency  gains  in  the  provision  of  public  schooling,  cutting  the  school  budget 
might have caused a decline in the quality of educational service. For the U.S., this decline in 
academic achievement is indeed corroborated by recent analyses of the impact of tax limits on 
student performances (e.g. Figlio & Rueben, 2001). Based on these results for the U.S., a test 
score  decreasing  impact  of  direct  democracy  on  student  achievement  would  not  be  a 
surprising  result  for  Switzerland,  as  its  political  institutions  can  been  shown  to  restrain 
subfederal expenses for schooling.  
This  study  aims  to  provide  such  evidence  for  similar  or  dissimilar  effects  of  direct 
legislation  on  public  education  in  Switzerland,  a  three-tier  federal  country  with  an 
autonomous school policy-making at the state level. Using a cross section of individual data 
on student performance in Switzerland in three core subjects obtained from a national study 
accompanying the OECD-PISA 2000 study, an educational production function augmented 
by institutional determinants of direct democracy is estimated. This model specification is 
similar  to  those  previously  employed  both  in  public  finance  studies  and  in  analyses  by  
  29
educational economists. For Switzerland, the degree of direct democracy is measured by a 
composite index that indicates the extent of overall empowerment of citizenry. In this study, 
as first step the spending restraint impact of direct democracy on educational spending is 
identified.  Then,  two  major  variations  of  the  production  function  are  estimated:  first,  a 
reduced form that excludes endogenous, budget-driven input factors at the school and class 
level,  and  second,  a  structural  form  that  includes  these  factors.  This  variation  in  model 
specification makes it possible to distinguish the direct institutional impact from an indirect 
impact,  and  equally  to  determine  whether  school  budgets  serve  as  direct  democracy’s 
transmission channel.  
For the reading literacy test, in the reduced form of the model, the findings from the OLS 
regressions indicate that a higher degree of direct democracy leads to lower performance by 
students in reading literacy test. This finding mirrors results obtained for the U.S. for the 
influence  of  tax  limits.  However,  after  the  inclusion  of  variables  controlling  for  various 
revenue-driven input factors at the school and class level, the negative influence of direct 
democracy disappears completely. From this result, it is concluded that school and class input 
factors whose quality is dependent on the school district's financial equipment are important 
for  student  academic  achievement,  and  that  the  test  score  lowering  impact  of  direct 
democracy  occurs  through  the  subfederal  budget.  Finally,  these  estimation  outcomes  also 
suggest that there exists no deleterious effect that goes beyond the purely budgetary impact, 
supporting the interpretation that no Leviathan-like behavior of the administrator is present 
that is not already reflected by the budgetary, endogenous variables. This finding contradicts 
the U.S. results in which a performance lowering impact in the structural form of the model 
remained (Downes, Dye, & McGuire, 1998).  
For mathematics, I find that, again, stronger popular rights appear to exert a deleterious 
impact on student performance with the sub-federal school budget working as transmission 
channel.  In  contrast  to  the  regressions  for  reading,  however,  a  higher  degree  of  direct  
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democracy leads to better student performance in the structural model – that is there is a direct 
achievement improving impact that becomes only evident when its indirect influence through 
the endogenous variables is accounted for. From this result it might be concluded that in more 
direct  democratic  cantons  more  resources  are  devoted  to  the  teaching  and  learning  of 
mathematics,  potentially  in  form  of  additional  school  resources,  which  might  have  been 
withdrawn  from  other  (non-test)  school  subjects.  Such  reallocation  towards  mathematics 
could  be  economically  justified  by  higher  expected  returns  on  Beckerian  human  capital 
accumulation compared to those in reading and thereby reflect the policy-makers response to 
according demands in the population.  
For natural science, neither a direct nor an indirect impact of direct legislation is detected. 
In explanation, it might well be that the late introduction of natural science subjects to the 
school  curriculum  does  not  allow  political  institutions  to  leave  a  decisive  mark  on  ninth 
graders’ test performances.  
For  all  three  subjects,  qualification  of  teachers  appears  to  be  the  most  important 
determinant of student performance. The analyses show that a higher share of teachers with a 
university  education  significantly  increases  student  test  scores  in  all  three  subjects. 
Furthermore, a direct link between the extent of direct democracy, the level of educational 
spending per pupil, and teacher qualification could be established for all three core subjects. 
This  result  suggests  that  school  budgets,  in  particular  teacher  qualification,  work  as  a 
transmission channels of the institutional impact. Clearly, teacher quality matters a great deal 
for student performance, but it is questionable whether differences in teacher qualification do 
account for variation in quality. Previous studies have been inconclusive with respect to the 
influence of teacher qualification (see Hanushek, 2002), and it might well be that the results 
presented here are driven by the specific institutional setting in Switzerland. In other words, 
the relevance of teacher qualification for education might well be country-specific. Further 
research is needed before a generalized judgment can be made.  
  31
From these results for Switzerland, concluding that restricting people’s direct control over 
the school budget leads to better student performance would be too simple. In fact, a spending 
restraint impact of direct legislation is only present in case voters are fiscally conservative. 
However, institutions of direct legislation equally allow to increase spending or to prevent 
cuts initiated by the government, as recent popular votes in Switzerland have revealed. In 
other words, what is needed is a debate in society about the objectives of public education and 
the amount of financial resources necessary to achieve them. Such discussion should take 
place not only in countries with institutions of direct democracy, but in any society. Based on 
this  piece  of  research,  the  only  policy-related  concrete  advice  that  can  be  given  for 
Switzerland is to increase the share of teachers with a university education in schools, and 
organize  public  education  in  such  way  (including  qualification  requirements,  career 
prospectus, wage structure) so that high quality teacher candidates are attracted. In this light, 
the recently started debate about attractiveness of teaching profession, optimal recruitment 
strategies as well as the call for university-level teacher education constitute initial steps in the 
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Endnotes 
 
1. The average test score of 494 for Switzerland was below the international mean of 500 for the PISA study.  
2.  Appropriate  information  on  this  issue  can  be  found  at  www.educa.ch,  or  the  Federal  Statistical  Office, 
www.bfs.admin.ch.  
3. In contrast to these organizational differences across cantons, school curricula in primary and secondary I 
stages of education have been harmonized to a great extent. 
4. See Romer & Rosenthal (1978, 1979, 1982, 1983) and Romer, Rosenthal, & Munley (1992). 
5. Efficiency gains serve as explanation for the growth-improving impact of direct democracy detected by Feld 
& Savioz (1997). 
6. The source ACIR (1995) provides a catalogue of existing tax limits. In contrast, Poterba (1997) does not 
report any significant influence of property tax limits on per pupil K-12 school spending by US states. Besides 
missing some political determinants in his model, it might well be that analysis at the aggregate level prevented 
identification of a significant impact.  
7. Available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/c101.html (10. Nov 2006) 
8. For Switzerland, also Grob & Wolter (2005) analyze determinants of educational spending across cantons, but 
with a focus on socio-demographic characteristics solely. In their analysis, political institutions are missing.  
9. Freitag & Bühlmann (2003) employ the number of held fiscal referenda and initiatives (in place of using the 
mere presence of institutions) with spending at the cantonal level as regressor, thus neglecting the financial 
contribution of local jurisdictions. Similarly, the data used by Santerre (1989) and Megdal (1983) are only cross-
sectional and obtained from local jurisdictions, among which fierce competition might prevent any differential 
impact of political institutions. Moreover, Sass (1991), using the identical dataset as Santerre (1989), detects no 
institutional impact once endogeneity of government structure is accounted for.  
10. Dye & McGuire (1997) identify a mitigating effect of strong competition between jurisdictions.  
11. It is, however, questionable whether a change in the ratio of administration to production costs provides 
sufficient evidence for one of the two theories. If instruction costs are more variable than administrative costs, in 
the short term only a cut in instruction costs might be practical.  
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12.  Earlier  contributions  to this  topic  from  the 1970s  until  the  very  early  1990s,  some empirical but  most 
informal, are described in Downes & Figlio (1999). These contributions, however, suffer from methodological 
shortcomings.  
13. In this study, although mitigated by competition among schools, a small negative impact of tax limits on 
student performance in mathematics is detected. 
14. Some of them, however, employ educational spending at the district level as a controlling factor in addition 
to the policy measure and institutional dummies (e.g. Downes & Figlio 1997).  
15. Combined cantonal and communal spending must be employed because in every single canton the financing 
of schooling is shared differently between these two tiers.  
16. The PISA data are used in analyses of e.g. Fuchs & Woessmann (2004), Fertig & Wright (2005).  
17. The peer group variables should be included to the model because an indirect institutional influence might be 
mediated through them. In this paper, however, we are interested in the direct institutional influence on a single 
student.  
18. In small classes, there might even exist a feedback relation and continuing interaction between the one and 
the other(s) (for empirical literature on peer effects, see Zimmer & Toma, 2000; Summers & Wolfe, 1977; 
Epple, Romano, & Sieg, 2003; Rangvid, 2004). 
19. The endogenous input factors in this study are district-level student-teacher ratios, student-administrator 
ratios, mean teaching experience of teachers, and share of teachers with B.A. or B.S. degree. 
20. This estimation method is also applied by educational economists to the analysis of PISA results using an 
international sample containing several countries.  
21. The full estimation results for the educational production function can be found in Table A5 of the Appendix.  
22.  These  results  are robust  to assuming endogeneity  or  exogeneity  of the  government  ideology and  fiscal 
decentralization variables. Endogeneity of fiscal decentralization might be caused by the correlation between the 
educational spending and total government spending variables, albeit probably to a small degree. Government 
ideology  might  be  endogenous  in  case  higher  educational  spending  induces  formerly  disenfranchised  and 
economically  marginalized  groups  favoring  income  redistribution  go  to  the  polls.  For  similar  results  with 
government ideology treated as endogenous, see Fischer (2005). 
23. This finding loosely corresponds with a result reported by Fuchs & Woessmann (2004) in an international 
PISA analysis.  
24. Omission of peer effects leads to even stronger results for mathematics test scores.  
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25. Only for natural science a ten percent significance of the direct democracy variable occurred in half of the 
regressions in the structural model, then showing the identical pattern of influence as for the mathematics test 
results and supporting hypothesis 3. 
26. Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin (2004) report that teachers in the US who switch schools choose institutions with 
better performing, higher income student bodies with a lower share of minority members.  
27. Selectivity is assumed in case admission is granted based on previous performance or by passing an entrance 
examination.  
28. The figures are based on samples with outliers excluded by 1.5 standard deviations of the residuals. The 
continuous line represents the regression line of the bivariate analysis. 
29. Indeed, teacher salary is among the factors which makes schools attractive to teachers (Hanushek, Kain & 
Rivkin, 2004; Figlio, 1997a). 
30.  For  this  reason,  the  model  does  not  include  fiscal,  political  or  economic  determinants  of  educational 
spending. The remaining controlling determinants include the degree of urbanization, the share of residents with 
a higher education, the size of the canton in terms of population, the share of old residents and of those in school 
age, the share of foreigners, the share of impoverished persons, a cultural variable, and a dichotomous variable 
for being a town-sized canton, that often cannot afford and does not to offer secondary II education preparing for 
university admission. I also control for school type and location. Estimation technique is OLS with clustering by 
cantons. Whenever possible, all variables have been averaged over 1990 to 2000. 
31. The results for the complete samples can be found in Table A6 of the Appendix. Exclusion of outliers yields 
a considerable increase in goodness of fit from about 0.2 (Table A6) up to 0.57 (Table 4). 
32. Estimation of the model with direct democracy included alongside with the spending variable shows that the 
school budget partly mediates the institutional impact teacher qualification in reading, mathematics and natural 
science. 
33. For more literature on the impact of financial resources in general available to schools on education, see e.g. 
Hanushek (1996, 1997, 2002), Ludwig & Bassi (1998), Card & Payne (2002).  
34. Depending on the canton, physics and chemistry are introduced either in the 7
th or 8
th grade. 
35. For literature on the influence of teachers’ wages on student outcomes, see Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin (1999, 
2004), Figlio (1999); and finally, for quality of teaching see e.g. Hanushek (2003), Buckingham (2003).  
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36. Estimating a more flexible Box-Cox transformation model, Meunier (2004) reports performance enhancing 
influence of the share of teaching personnel with a university degree on student performance for all three core 
subjects.  
37. In 2002, the Swiss government and the cantons decided to reform the system of teacher education. From 
2004  on,  only  persons  with  a  completed  secondary  II  education  shall  be  admitted  to  teacher  training  and 
educated either at universities or at newly founded colleges of education (EDK, 2001).  
38. This is the case for e.g. most US states and Germany. 
39 Fischer (2005) shows that instructional spending is reduced to a lesser extent than administrative spending, 
clearly rejecting the Leviathan-hypothesis. Unfortunately, Swiss data on educational expenses are not available 
at the school district level. Furthermore, cantonal data provided by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office do not 
allow to split the budget into more disaggregated components similar to those used in the US studies.  Justina A.V. Fischer 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for test scores 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Total sample           
reading  7979  498.297  92.532  27.60  884.49 
mathematics  4440  529.563  94.063  202.14  815.90 
natural science  4443  497.601  95.638  168.60  830.09 
Reduced form sample           
reading  3530  531.639  78.871  98.22  812.88 
mathematics  1917  559.255  80.658  202.14  815.9 
natural science  1593  525.963  91.515  168.6  804.54 
Structural form sample           
reading  3071  532.738  78.681  166.01  812.88 
mathematics  1655  559.362  81.211  202.14  815.9 





Table 2: Determinants of educational spending for compulsory 
schooling in Swiss cantons, 1980 – 1998 
  (1)  (2) 
  Total  Outliers excluded 
Direct Democracy  -0.264**  -0.211** 
  (6.55)  (5.20) 
Fiscal decentralization  0.383(*)  0.14 
  (1.81)  (0.90) 
Tax competition  -1.007*  -1.462** 
  (2.27)  (4.49) 
Lumpsum transfers  -0.296**  -0.552** 
  (2.80)  (6.88) 
Fiscal constraints  0.004  0.005 
  (0.17)  (0.23) 
Coalition size  0.137**  0.087* 
  (2.84)  (2.41) 
Ideology of government  -0.064  -0.354** 
  (0.35)  (2.61) 
French- or Italian-speaking canton  -0.816**  -0.690** 
  (4.93)  (4.47) 
Urbanization  -0.002  -0.003 
  (1.00)  (1.54) 
National income  -1.070**  -0.725** 
  (4.03)  (3.22) 
Small canton  -0.357**  -0.428** 
  (4.67)  (7.26) 
Share of highly educated  0.030**  0.026** 
  (2.67)  (2.81) 
Share of old people  -0.084**  -0.061** 
  (4.36)  (4.07) 
Share of young people  -0.083**  -0.048* 
  (3.01)  (2.18) 
Constant  19.704**  18.687** 
  (13.32)  (15.02) 
     
Observations  312  272 
Adj. R2  0.720  0.811 
Jarcque Bera test  5.539 (*)  5.311(*) 
Note: OLS regression with standard errors calculated according to the Newey-West 
method.  Time  dummies  are  included  but  not  reported.  **,  *,  (*)  denote 






Table 3: OLS Regressions for PISA test scores  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  reading  mathematics  natural science 
             
Direct Democracy  -9.377*  -1.546  0.190  10.462*  -2.937  7.183 
  (2.45)  (0.34)  (0.04)  (2.25)  (0.61)  (1.61) 
French- or Italian- 
speaking region  -5.294  3.183  19.21  34.748*  32.400*  7.836 
  (0.46)  (0.26)  (1.40)  (2.41)  (2.34)  (0.60) 
Individual-level variables  included    included    included   
Type and location of school  included    included    included   
Class-level determinants  included    included    included   
Peer-group variables  included    included    included   
Cantonal-level determinants  included    included    included   
             
Poor conditions 1 at school    0.966    4.525    5.647 
    (0.11)    (0.34)    (0.43) 
Poor conditions 2 at school    -4.791    -4.923    -56.732** 
    (0.41)    (0.40)    (3.02) 
No access to PC at school    -6.543*    -6.450    4.418 
    (2.15)    (1.40)    (0.73) 
Teacher shortage in test subject    -2.841    5.120    -29.717* 
    (0.26)    (0.42)    (2.49) 
Share of test subject teachers 
with a master’s degree    25.473*    28.838**    22.983* 
    (2.55)    (2.82)    (2.29) 
Share of teaching personnel 
with a master’s degree    22.819*    19.539    35.682** 
    (1.99)    (1.49)    (2.70) 
Total hours of schooling    0.024    0.076*    0.111* 
(all subjects)    (0.77)    (2.09)    (2.60) 
Student-teacher ratio    -0.103    0.311    1.299(*) 
    (0.17)    (0.51)    (1.86) 
             
Constant  607.681**  486.375**  556.930**  347.356*  629.763**  584.424** 
  (5.62)  (3.66)  (3.57)  (2.23)  (4.69)  (4.06) 
             
Observations  3530  3071  1917  1655  1593  1262 
F-test  28.31**  27.70**  13.36**  13.73**  13.73**  22.49** 
Number of schools  192  164  179  153  180  134 
Adjusted R2  0.27  0.28  0.21  0.23  0.29  0.32 
Note: OLS regressions with robust standard errors obtained through clustering by schools. **, *, (*) denote 




Table 4: Educational spending and qualification of teachers 
  reading  all subjects  mathematics 
natural 
science 
         
log (educational spending) 
1990 – 2000  1.664*  2.892**  2.484**  1.245(*) 
  (2.40)  (5.29)  (3.01)  (1.91) 
French- or Italian-speaking 
canton  0.499**  0.099  0.420**  0.570** 
  (5.31)  (1.70)  (4.04)  (5.90) 
School variables  included  included  included  included 
Cantonal determinants  included  included  included  included 
         
Number of schools  167  171  174  155 
Adj. R2  0.570  0.574  0.434  0.543 
Jarcque Bera test  5.701(*)  4.423  5.733(*)  1.751 
Note: OLS regression with robust standard errors obtained through clustering by cantons. **, 
*, (*) denote significances at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Dependent variable 
is the percentage of teachers of the subject with a master’s degree. Controlling variables at 
the cantonal level include the degree of urbanization, the share of residents with a higher 
education, the size of the canton in terms of population, the share of old residents and of 
those  in  school  age,  the  share  of  foreigners,  the  share  of  impoverished  persons,  and  a 
dichotomous variable for town-sized cantons. School-level determinants account for type of 
school (private/state),  selectivity, and  location of school  (village,  town, small  city,  large 
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Table A1: Distribution of observations for reading and 









Zürich  200  169  3.500 
Bern  373  339  3.021 
Luzern  67  56  4.417 
Uri  -  -  5.125 
Schwyz  26  26  4.927 
Obwalden  21  21  4.625 
Nidwalden  -  -  4.438 
Glarus  8  8  5.750 
Zug  11  11  4.417 
Freiburg  572  515  2.792 
Solothurn  20  20  5.250 
Basel-Stadt  46  45  4.396 
Basel-Landschaft  55  30  5.479 
Schaffhausen  -  -  5.208 
Appenzell-Ausserrhoden  1  1  5.500 
Appenzell-Innerrhoden   -  -  5.438 
St. Gallen  378  247  3.458 
Graubünden  23  23  4.833 
Aargau  215  171  5.458 
Thurgau  66  54  4.333 
Tessin  -  -  2.250 
Waadt  226  210  2.500 
Wallis  353  349  3.583 
Neuenburg  370  370  2.188 
Genf  322  229  1.750 
Jura  177  177  3.708 
       
German-speaking cantons  1534  1245   
French-speaking cantons  1996  1826   
Sum  3530  3071   









Table A2: Description of variables 
Variables  Description 
Dependent variable 
WARM estimate (weighted likelihood estimate): difficulty adjusted 
test score in reading literacy / mathematics / natural science test  
Direct democracy   Index of direct democracy from 1 (min.) to 6 (max.) in 2000 
French- or Italian-speaking 
region 
1 if language community is either French- or Italian-speaking, 
 0 otherwise (cantreg) 
Individual and family variables 
Occupational status 2 
PISA International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status of 
the parents as a proxy of income, 28 – 37 index points 
Occupational status 3  38 – 47 index points 
Occupational status 4  48 – 57 index points 
Occupational status 5  58 – 67 index points 
Occupational status 6  68 – 77 index points 
Occupational status 7  >78 index points 
No occupational status data  1 if missing value in hisei-Index (hisei), 0 otherwise 
Number of siblings  Number of siblings (nsib) 
Old student  1 if student older than 204 months / 15 years (age), 0 otherwise 
Young student  1 if student younger than 180 months / 17 years (age), 0 otherwise 
Books at home  Number of books at home (st37q01) 
No late arrival at school 
1 if student claims never to have arrived late for school in the last two 
school weeks (st29q03), 0 otherwise 
No PC at home  1 if student never has access to a PC at home (it01q01), 0 otherwise 
Female student  1 if student is female, 0 otherwise (st03q01) 
Both parents work 




1 if student usually lives with father and mother (st04q01, st04q03),  
0 otherwise 
Native student  1 if country of birth is Switzerland (st16q01), 0 otherwise 
Foreign parents 
1 if country of birth of both father and mother is not Switzerland 
(st16q02, st16q03), 0 otherwise 
Second generation  1 if only one parent is born abroad (st16q02, st16q03), 0 otherwise 
No test language spoken at 
home 
1 if language spoken at home is not test-language (st17q01),  
0 otherwise 
Parents medium education 
Father and/or mother completed lower secondary level (fisced, 
misced) 
Parents high education 
Father and/or mother completed upper secondary level (fisced, 
misced) 
Mother tertiary education  Mother completed tertiary education (misced) 
Father tertiary education  Father completed tertiary education (fisced) 
Family culture:  
Discussion of politics 
1 if student regularly discusses political or social issues with parents 
(st19q01), 0 otherwise 
Family culture:  
Listening to classical music 
1 if student regularly listens to classical music together with parents 
(st19q03), 0 otherwise 
Family culture:  
Main meal eaten together 
1 if several times a week parents eat main meal with student 
(st19q05), 0 otherwise  
Family culture:  
Regular talking 
1 if several times a week parents spend time just talking to the 





Table A2: Description of variables (cont.) 
School and class variables 
Village school  1 if school is located in a village (< 3000 E) (sc01q01), 0 otherwise 
Small town school 
1 if school is located in a small town (3000 – 15 000) (sc01q01),  
0 otherwise 
City school 
1 if school is located in a city  (100 000 to 1 000000) (sc01q01),  
0 otherwise 
Private school  1 if school is private, 0 otherwise (sc03q01) 
Selective school 
1  if  admission  to  school  is  always  based  on  student's  record  of 
academic performance including placement tests, 0 otherwise 
Regular testing in class 
1  if  students  are  assessed  four  or  more  times  a  year  using 
standardized  or  teacher  developed  tests,  0  otherwise  (sc16q01, 
sc16q02) 
Homework feedback 
1 if homework is counted as part of mark or teachers grade 
homework most of the time or always (st32q07, st32q03),  
0 otherwise 
Problems  with  discipline  in 
class 
1 if in most lessons or in every lesson, students don't listen to what 
the teacher says, students don't start working for a long time after the 
lesson begins, there is noise and disorder, or at the start of class more 
than five minutes are spent doing nothing (st26q13, st16q14, st26q16, 
st26q17) 
Peer variables 
Peer  performance  in  test 
subject 
Peers' mean performance divided by peers' standard deviation in test 
subject test scores 
Share of female peers  Share of female students in student's peer group 
Share of foreign peers  Share of students born abroad in student's peer group 
Cantonal variables 
Cantonal  share  of  well 
educated people 
Share of cantonal residents with a tertiary education or a high school 
degree 
Share of aged residents  Share of cantonal residents older than 65 years 
Unemployment rate  Cantonal unemployment rate 
Share of Protestants  Share of Protestant residents  in canton 
Share of Muslims  Share of Muslim residents in canton 
Share  of  persons  with  no 
religious denomination  Share of residents with no religious affiliation 
Share of poor persons 
Share of persons who cannot afford savings of 100 CHF per month 
(SHP data) 
Urbanization 
Share  of  residents  living  in  agglomerations  with  at  least  100,000 
inhabitants 
Size of canton  Natural logarithm of the cantonal residential population 
 Revenue-driven inputs 
Poor conditions at school 1 
1 if school suffers from poor building, poor heating and/or inadequate 
space (sc11q01 sc11q02 sc11q03), 0 otherwise 
Poor conditions at school 2 
1 if school suffers from a lack of instructional material and /or a poor 
library (a lot) (sc11q04 sc11q06 ), 0 otherwise 
No access to PC at school  1 if student has no access to PC at school (it01q02), 0 otherwise 
Teacher  shortage  in  test 
subject 
1 if a shortage of teachers in general and /or test subject teachers in 
particular (Some/a lot) (sc21q01, sc21q02), 0 otherwise 
Share of test subject teachers 
with a master’s degree 
Proportion of language /mathematics /natural science teachers with a 





Table A2: Description of variables (cont.) 
Share of teaching personnel 
with a master’s degree 
Proportion of teachers with a master’s degree of teaching personnel at 
school (propqual) 
Total hours of schooling  Total number of schooling hours per year (tothrs) 
Student-teacher ratio 
Student-teacher ratio as school size divided by number of teachers 
(stratio) 
 
Notes: In parentheses are the names of the variables on which the determinants of student performance are 
based. These labels are identical to those used in the OECD-PISA study conducted by the OECD in 2000. The 
questionnaires used for the Swiss national study are also identical to those used for the PISA study with the 
exception  of  a  few  questions  which  are  irrelevant  to  this  model  specification.  These  labels  also  provide 
information about which questionnaire contained the original question. The first two letters either indicate 'st' for 
student questionnaire, 'it' for the information technology questionnaire, or 'sc' for the school questionnaire. The 
first two digits then stand for the number of the general issue, and 'qXX' for the related single question. The 
following variables have already been derived and computed by the issuing institution: wleread, hisei, nsib, 
miscedu, fiscedu, stratio, tothrs and are already part of the dataset. More information on the construction of these 
variables can be obtained from the issuing institution at http://www.sidos.ch/data/projects/pisa/ (13.04.2004). 
Base categories are schools in small towns (15,000 to 100,000 inhabitants), a low parental income (hisei1: below 
28 index points), and a high but not tertiary education of parents (misced = 4 or 5, fisced = 4 or 5).  
 
Sources: all individual-level, school-level and peer-level variables are obtained from the National PISA study or 
derived from it. The index of direct democracy is based on based on Stutzer (1999) and on own calculations. All 
cantonal-level  variables are obtained from the Swiss  Federal Statistical  Office except for the share of poor 









Table A3: Descriptive statistics of regressors and regressands 
  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Reading test score  3071  532.74  78.68  166.01  812.88 
Direct democracy   3071  3.21  0.95  1.75  5.75 
French- or Italian-speaking region  3071  0.59  0.49  0  1 
Occupational status 2  3071  0.11  0.31  0  1 
Occupational status 3  3071  0.23  0.42  0  1 
Occupational status 4  3071  0.24  0.43  0  1 
Occupational status 5  3071  0.05  0.23  0  1 
Occupational status 6  3071  0.21  0.40  0  1 
Occupational status 7  3071  0.05  0.21  0  1 
No occupational status data  3071  0.08  0.27  0  1 
Number of siblings  3071  2.55  3.72  0  24 
Old student  3071  0.03  0.16  0  1 
Young student  3071  0.23  0.42  0  1 
Books at home  3071  4.75  1.51  1  7 
No late arrival at school  3071  0.72  0.45  0  1 
No PC at home  3071  0.08  0.27  0  1 
Female student  3071  0.52  0.50  0  1 
Both parents work  3071  0.64  0.48  0  1 
Intact family  3071  0.86  0.35  0  1 
Native student  3071  0.90  0.30  0  1 
Foreign parents  3071  0.15  0.36  0  1 
Second generation  3071  0.15  0.36  0  1 
No test language spoken at home  3071  0.13  0.34  0  1 
Parents medium education  3071  0.34  0.47  0  1 
Parents high education  3071  0.59  0.49  0  1 
Mother tertiary education  3071  0.20  0.40  0  1 
Father tertiary education  3071  0.35  0.48  0  1 
Family culture: Discussion of politics  3071  0.14  0.34  0  1 
Family culture: Listening to classical music  3071  0.04  0.19  0  1 
Family culture: Main meal eaten together  3071  0.93  0.26  0  1 
Family culture: Regular talking  3071  0.59  0.49  0  1 
Village school  3071  0.08  0.28  0  1 
Small town school  3071  0.51  0.50  0  1 
City school  3071  0.11  0.32  0  1 
Private school  3071  0.06  0.23  0  1 
Selective school  3071  0.60  0.49  0  1 
Regular testing in class  3071  0.84  0.36  0  1 
Homework feedback  3071  0.28  0.45  0  1 
Problems with discipline in class  3071  0.55  0.50  0  1 
Peer performance in reading  3071  7.30  1.77  3.48  12.85 
Share of female peers  3071  50.58  9.13  0  100 
Share of foreign peers  3071  13.09  8.15  0  48.28 
Cantonal share of well educated people  3071  24.27  4.65  15.49  35.63 
Share of aged residents  3071  15.08  1.67  11.88  20.97 
Unemployment rate  3071  2.10  0.81  0.5  4.4 
Share of Protestants  3071  29.41  18.10  6.31  67.10 
Share of Muslims  3071  3.64  1.21  1.87  6.72 
Share of persons with no religious denomination  3071  10.84  6.84  3.74  31.02 
Share of poor persons  3071  17.07  6.85  1.73  35.63 
Urbanization  3071  58.80  21.30  14.80  100 
Size of canton  3071  12.70  0.75  10.39  14.01  
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Table A3: Descriptive statistics of regressors and regressands (cont.) 
  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Poor conditions at school 1  3071  0.05  0.22  0  1 
Poor conditions at school 2  3071  0.04  0.20  0  1 
No access to PC at school  3071  0.23  0.42  0  1 
Teacher shortage in reading  3071  0.09  0.29  0  1 
Share of reading teachers with a master’s degree  3071  0.63  0.35  0  1 
Share of teaching personnel with a master’s degree  3071  0.68  0.27  0  1 
Total hours of schooling  3071  976.15  85.83  579  1267 
Student-teacher ratio  3071  12.85  3.63  1.89  49.3 
           
Mathematics test score  1655  559.36  81.21  202.14  815.9 
Peer performance in mathematics  1655  7.43  1.87  3.20  24.37 
Teacher shortage in mathematics  1655  0.11  0.31  0  1 
Share of mathematics teachers with a master’s degree  1655  0.56  0.36  0  1 
           
Natural science test score   1262  530.82  91.27  168.6  804.54 
Peer performance in natural science  1262  6.94  1.89  3.37  20.12 
Teacher shortage in natural science  1262  0.08  0.28  0  1 
Share of natural science teachers with a master’s degree  1262  0.64  0.41  0  1 














Table A4: Determinants of educational spending for compulsory schooling 
in Swiss cantons, current and investment expenditures, 1980 – 1998 










Direct Democracy  -0.267**  -0.232**  -0.389**  -0.360** 
  (6.61)  (5.89)  (6.44)  (7.29) 
Fiscal decentralization  0.394(*)  0.124  0.784**  0.814** 
  (1.85)  (0.76)  (2.62)  (2.75) 
Tax competition  -1.089*  -1.572**  0.002  -0.691 
  (2.44)  (4.78)  (0.00)  (1.30) 
Lumpsum transfers  -0.300**  -0.573**  -0.530**  -0.749** 
  (2.81)  (7.01)  (3.14)  (5.59) 
Fiscal constraints  0.006  -0.005  0.027  0.026 
  (0.24)  (0.23)  (0.74)  (0.87) 
Coalition size  0.131**  0.106**  0.257**  0.321** 
  (2.72)  (2.77)  (3.76)  (6.01) 
Ideology of government  -0.071  -0.328*  0.205  -0.235 
  (0.39)  (2.34)  (0.76)  (1.17) 
French- or Italian- 
speaking canton  -0.851**  -0.785**  -1.078**  -1.301** 
  (5.11)  (5.16)  (4.30)  (6.11) 
Urbanization  -0.002  -0.002  -0.005  -0.007* 
  (1.04)  (1.40)  (1.26)  (2.13) 
National income  -1.066**  -0.751**  -1.945**  -2.123** 
  (4.00)  (3.36)  (4.77)  (6.33) 
Small canton  -0.350**  -0.425**  -0.951**  -0.872** 
  (4.56)  (6.98)  (7.87)  (8.53) 
Share of highly educated  0.031**  0.028**  0.043*  0.070** 
  (2.71)  (3.04)  (2.20)  (4.70) 
Share of old people  -0.087**  -0.059**  -0.183**  -0.154** 
  (4.39)  (3.95)  (6.87)  (7.23) 
Share of young people  -0.085**  -0.040(*)  -0.176**  -0.147** 
  (3.05)  (1.77)  (4.76)  (4.80) 
Constant  19.850**  18.712**  27.515**  27.501** 
  (13.28)  (15.37)  (13.14)  (15.66) 
         
Observations  312  269  312  277 
Adj. R2  0.718  0.813  0.813  0.893 
Jarcque Bera test  6.131*  1.962  4.855(*)  2.208 




Table A5: OLS regressions for PISA test scores  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  reading  mathematics  natural science 
             
Direct Democracy  -9.377*  -1.546  0.190  10.462*  -2.937  7.183 
  (2.45)  (0.34)  (0.04)  (2.25)  (0.61)  (1.61) 
French- or Italian-speaking 
region  -5.294  3.183  19.210  34.748*  32.400*  7.836 
  (0.46)  (0.26)  (1.40)  (2.41)  (2.34)  (0.60) 
Individual and family variables             
Occupational status 2  1.096  4.491  2.136  -0.708  -25.462(*)  -31.717* 
  (0.13)  (0.51)  (0.20)  (0.06)  (1.94)  (2.29) 
Occupational status 3  15.558*  14.122(*)  17.315(*)  10.35  -1.167  -13.317 
  (2.10)  (1.77)  (1.71)  (0.95)  (0.09)  (0.97) 
Occupational status 4  12.742(*)  12.01  5.238  -0.062  -6.949  -18.762 
  (1.71)  (1.54)  (0.54)  (0.01)  (0.53)  (1.31) 
Occupational status 5  27.247**  29.628**  12.712  9.221  15.863  5.754 
  (2.80)  (2.88)  (1.17)  (0.80)  (1.06)  (0.36) 
Occupational status 6  24.012**  24.453**  16.573  10.908  15.546  2.34 
  (2.96)  (2.87)  (1.61)  (1.01)  (1.17)  (0.16) 
Occupational status 7  32.412**  30.466**  30.907*  28.225*  30.476*  18.166 
  (3.31)  (2.92)  (2.44)  (2.13)  (2.14)  (1.14) 
No occupational status data  -2.806  -3.942  -3.020  -10.041  -25.989(*)  -27.804(*) 
  (0.33)  (0.44)  (0.25)  (0.81)  (1.81)  (1.75) 
Number of siblings  -0.917**  -0.956**  -0.315  -0.023  -1.093  -1.373(*) 
  (3.09)  (3.00)  (0.71)  (0.05)  (1.58)  (1.87) 
Old student  -30.109**  -29.348**  -29.809**  -27.675*  -24.384(*)  -28.455(*) 
  (3.65)  (3.02)  (2.89)  (2.57)  (1.73)  (1.70) 
Young student  10.450**  10.173**  6.404  6.528  11.037(*)  8.618 
  (3.48)  (3.32)  (1.45)  (1.39)  (1.79)  (1.21) 
Books at home  9.136**  8.612**  9.270**  8.890**  8.861**  7.346** 
  (10.43)  (9.26)  (8.49)  (7.55)  (6.03)  (4.32) 
No late arrival at school  2.712  2.957  4.992  6.22  17.518**  16.645** 
  (0.92)  (0.95)  (1.28)  (1.41)  (3.36)  (2.87) 
No PC at home  -16.187**  -14.146**  -21.243**  -17.179(*)  -19.435*  -27.020** 
  (3.43)  (2.89)  (2.74)  (1.96)  (2.07)  (2.76) 
Female student  18.256**  16.993**  -27.788**  -28.584**  -17.631**  -20.186** 
  (8.00)  (7.19)  (8.59)  (8.29)  (4.56)  (4.74) 
Both parents work  -0.396  -1.687  1.397  -1.382  -3.335  0.145 
  (0.17)  (0.66)  (0.39)  (0.36)  (0.87)  (0.03) 
Intact family  0.296  -0.526  3.449  6.306  8.438  10.881(*) 
  (0.09)  (0.15)  (0.73)  (1.24)  (1.61)  (1.76) 
Native student  4.349  3.05  0.242  3.342  22.037*  18.519 
  (0.85)  (0.55)  (0.04)  (0.50)  (2.29)  (1.57) 
foreign parents  -6.079  -5.346  -17.071*  -13.105(*)  -10.508  -13.179 
  (1.33)  (1.06)  (2.43)  (1.74)  (0.97)  (0.94) 
Second generation  1.516  2.612  -4.984  -4.294  6.899  3.623 
  (0.47)  (0.72)  (1.03)  (0.85)  (1.15)  (0.55) 
No test language spoken  -12.825**  -14.943**  -14.543*  -14.241(*)  -1.044  -5.582 
at home  (3.00)  (3.22)  (2.08)  (1.82)  (0.12)  (0.54) 
Medium education of parents  -3.745  -2.572  -12.583*  -12.649*  -2.539  -1.399 




Table A5: OLS regressions for PISA test scores (cont.) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  reading  mathematics  natural science 
high education of parents  15.779**  15.270**  1.460  -0.416  22.804**  22.327** 
  (3.94)  (3.65)  (0.26)  (0.07)  (3.90)  (3.41) 
Tertiary education of mother  -2.573  -2.804  -8.191  -8.512  6.986  8.827 
  (0.62)  (0.65)  (1.40)  (1.40)  (1.02)  (1.08) 
Tertiary education of father  1.871  3.422  -0.791  -2.051  3.055  5.605 
  (0.60)  (1.04)  (0.15)  (0.36)  (0.69)  (1.12) 
Family culture:  7.562*  8.309*  3.062  4.755  2.127  2.757 
Discussion of politics  (2.43)  (2.52)  (0.67)  (0.93)  (0.40)  (0.46) 
Family culture:  -6.729  -5.452  -5.536  -6.017  14.458  23.674 
Listening to classical music  (1.18)  (0.94)  (0.59)  (0.62)  (1.15)  (1.52) 
Family culture:   4.618  4.893  6.648  7.649  -0.380  -3.108 
Main meal eaten together  (0.90)  (0.90)  (1.03)  (1.05)  (0.05)  (0.37) 
Family culture:  3.732  3.835  1.296  0.024  -3.511  -0.669 
Regular talking  (1.35)  (1.31)  (0.35)  (0.01)  (0.87)  (0.16) 
School and class variables             
Village school  -5.845  -3.563  -31.337**  -22.542*  -23.946*  -27.946* 
  (0.59)  (0.34)  (2.85)  (2.44)  (2.14)  (2.23) 
Small town school  -4.113  0.107  -9.969  -7.087  -5.068  -11.987(*) 
  (0.76)  (0.02)  (1.47)  (1.11)  (0.68)  (1.70) 
City school  14.68  7.659  7.884  5.158  15.572  8.244 
  (1.64)  (0.72)  (0.62)  (0.35)  (1.12)  (0.56) 
Private school  3.333  -0.214  -6.572  -4.604  3.118  13.994(*) 
  (0.42)  (0.02)  (0.61)  (0.49)  (0.36)  (1.74) 
Selective school  12.860**  4.667  9.066(*)  3.065  10.657(*)  -2.26 
  (2.91)  (0.96)  (1.75)  (0.66)  (1.87)  (0.34) 
Regular testing in class  7.302  8.46  5.493  0.000  10.32  2.014 
  (1.26)  (1.46)  (1.00)  (0.00)  (1.22)  (0.23) 
Homework feedback  -15.387**  -13.268**  -21.479**  -19.519**  -10.020*  -8.655 
  (5.17)  (4.40)  (5.00)  (4.28)  (2.00)  (1.51) 
Problems with discipline  -11.656**  -11.006**  -2.633  -5.163  -11.856**  -3.813 
in class  (3.73)  (3.57)  (0.62)  (1.22)  (2.74)  (0.82) 
Peer variables             
Peer performance in test subject  7.925**  6.148**  3.788*  4.402**  5.400**  0.663 
  (4.73)  (3.34)  (2.46)  (3.36)  (2.84)  (0.30) 
Share of female peers  0.08  -0.128  0.281  -0.047  -0.116  -0.762* 
  (0.35)  (0.50)  (1.01)  (0.18)  (0.35)  (2.13) 
Share of foreign peers  -0.745(*)  -0.744(*)  -1.149**  -1.317**  -1.405**  -1.244** 
  (1.80)  (1.70)  (2.73)  (2.89)  (2.96)  (2.79) 
Cantonal variables             
Cantonal share of well educated 
people  1.074  0.345  2.218  2.511  -0.390  -1.720 
  (0.93)  (0.27)  (1.49)  (1.64)  (0.26)  (0.93) 
Share of aged residents  1.581  -3.553  2.534  -3.274  -1.496  -8.942(*) 
  (0.50)  (1.00)  (0.51)  (0.69)  (0.35)  (1.80) 
Unemployment rate  9.094  2.766  9.248  1.929  -4.520  -3.685 
  (1.06)  (0.29)  (0.93)  (0.20)  (0.42)  (0.30) 
Share of Protestants  0.173  0.374  0.452  0.842*  0.366  0.895* 
  (0.55)  (1.00)  (1.13)  (2.08)  (0.85)  (1.99) 
Share of Muslim  1.764  0.168  2.948  -0.408  3.592  -2.781 
  (0.60)  (0.05)  (0.79)  (0.10)  (0.96)  (0.66)  
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Table A5: OLS regressions for PISA test scores (cont.) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  reading  mathematics  natural science 
Share of persons with no 
religious denomination  0.720  1.840  -0.440  0.716  0.577  2.594 
  (0.55)  (1.22)  (0.25)  (0.39)  (0.35)  (1.37) 
Share of poor persons  -2.548**  -1.084  -2.452*  -1.011  -2.256*  -0.458 
  (3.08)  (1.03)  (2.10)  (0.84)  (2.09)  (0.32) 
Urbanization  -0.758(*)  -0.542  -0.509  -0.138  -0.257  -0.184 
  (1.74)  (1.08)  (0.76)  (0.23)  (0.54)  (0.38) 
Size of canton  -14.311  -4.208  -10.515  -0.964  -11.356  -6.899 
  (1.59)  (0.37)  (0.89)  (0.08)  (1.03)  (0.56) 
             
Poor conditions 1 at school    0.966    4.525    5.647 
    (0.11)    (0.34)    (0.43) 
Poor conditions 2 at school    -4.791    -4.923    -56.732** 
    (0.41)    (0.40)    (3.02) 
No access to PC at school    -6.543*    -6.45    4.418 
    (2.15)    (1.40)    (0.73) 
Teacher shortage in test subject    -2.841    5.120    -29.717* 
    (0.26)    (0.42)    (2.49) 
Share of test subject teachers 
with a master’s degree    25.473*    28.838**    22.983* 
    (2.55)    (2.82)    (2.29) 
Share of teaching personnel 
with a master’s degree    22.819*    19.539    35.682** 
    (1.99)    (1.49)    (2.70) 
Total hours of schooling    0.024    0.076*    0.111* 
(all subjects)    (0.77)    (2.09)    (2.60) 
Student-teacher ratio    -0.103    0.311    1.299(*) 
    (0.17)    (0.51)    (1.86) 
             
Constant  607.681**  486.375**  556.930**  347.356*  629.763**  584.424** 
  (5.62)  (3.66)  (3.57)  (2.23)  (4.69)  (4.06) 
             
Observations  3530  3071  1917  1655  1593  1262 
F-test  28.31**  27.70**  13.36**  13.73**  13.73**  22.49** 
Number of schools  192  164  179  153  180  134 
Adjusted R2  0.27  0.28  0.21  0.23  0.29  0.32 








Table A6: Educational spending and qualification of teachers 
  reading  all subjects  mathematics 
natural 
science 
         
log (educational spending) 
1990 – 2000  1.403  2.111(*)  1.826*  0.942 
  (1.54)  (2.08)  (2.36)  (0.78) 
French- or Italian-speaking 
canton  0.434**  0.085  0.322**  0.410* 
  (4.62)  (0.87)  (3.47)  (2.40) 
School variables  included  included  included  included 
Cantonal determinants  included  included  included  included 
         
Number of schools  197  201  198  178 
Adj. R2  0.201  0.282  0.172  0.170 
Jarcque Bera test  5.295(*)  3.131  4.883(*)  3.597 
Note: see Table 4 
 
 